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Abstract   This paper discusses the epistemic status of biology from the standpoint 
of the systemic approach to living systems based on the notion of biological auton-
omy. This approach aims to provide an understanding of the distinctive character of 
biological systems and this paper analyses its theoretical and epistemological di-
mensions. The paper argues that, considered from this perspective, biological sys-
tems are examples of emergent phenomena, that the biological domain exhibits spe-
cial features with respect to other domains, and that biology as a discipline employs 
some core concepts, such as teleology, function, regulation among others, that are 
irreducible to those employed in physics and chemistry. It addresses the claim made 
by Jacques Monod that biology as a science is marginal. It argues that biology is 
general insofar as it constitutes a paradigmatic example of complexity science, both 
in terms of how it defines the theoretical object of study and of the epistemology 
and heuristics employed. As such, biology may provide lessons that can be applied 
more widely to develop an epistemology of complex systems.  
1 Introduction 
The question “what is life?”, the title of the seminal essay by Erwin Schrödinger 
(1944), keeps raising several theoretical and epistemological issues. Theoretical is-
sues concern for example what types of systems living organisms are, the identifi-
cation of their distinctive features and their differences with respect to other natural 
systems such as physical, chemical ones, or ecological and social ones, not to men-
tion hard questions such as how life originated. An example of the complexity of 
this question is the wide and intense debate on the definitions of life, characterized 
by a lack of consensus and by the proliferation of definitions proposed (Popa, 2004; 
Bich & Green, 2018).  
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Moreover, the question about life has important epistemological implications. It 
raises the problem of how to characterize, describe and explain living systems and 
biological phenomena in general. The study of living systems has shown the inade-
quacies of the framework of deductive nomological explanation that had dominated 
discussions of scientific explanation in the middle decades of the 20th century. The 
deductive nomological framework had emphasized the importance of scientific 
laws, with physics as the science of reference. The study of biological systems, in-
stead, has given rise to an interest in notions such as emergence, due to the difficul-
ties or impossibilities of using one level such as that of physical systems and its 
laws, to account for a different one, the biological, or to understand a system on the 
basis of a description of its parts alone. In the last decades an increasing attention 
has been paid to the specific types of explanations used in biology. Recognizing that 
biologists seldom refer to laws when advancing explanations, Bechtel and Richard-
son (1993/2010) focused on the fact that biologists often explain a phenomenon by 
describing the responsible mechanism, identifying the parts involved, their opera-
tions, and their organization rather than identifying or referring to laws. This view 
has been at the origin of the neo mechanistic approach in philosophy of science (see 
also Machamer et al., 2000; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver & Darden, 2013; 
Glennan, 2017). 
The distinctiveness of biology and the complexity underlying the notion of life 
may lead one to inquire into the epistemic status of biology. Among others, Jacques 
Monod directly addressed this issue at the beginning of the preface to his book 
“Chance and Necessity” (Monod, 1970). He did so by somehow acknowledging the 
‘special’ character of biological system, and by identifying ‘special’ with ‘rare’. 
Biological systems constitute only a minimal fraction of natural systems, and there-
fore, according to Monod, the study of biology might not lead to the discovery of 
general laws applicable outside the biosphere. In his view biology is marginal. 
In this paper I address this issue and question Monod’s claim. I do so by starting 
from a characterization of living systems in terms of autonomy (section 2), to dis-
cuss the general theoretical and epistemological implications of understanding bi-
ology as (in aspecific sense) special (section 3). As suggested by Robert Rosen “per-
haps the first lesson to be learned from biology is that there are lessons to be learned 
from biology” (2000: 275). I argue (section 4) that biology is not marginal and pro-
vides important lessons that may be applied more widely to develop an epistemol-
ogy of complex systems. 
2 What is life? an organizational view 
When Erwin Schrödinger, as a physicist, addressed the basic question of biology, 
“what is life?” (Schrödinger, 1944), he brought forth the idea that understanding 
biological systems might have required extending the framework of physics by 
providing new laws and concepts. This idea of developing a new physics and 
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introducing new laws was later pursued with a different approach by Stuart Kauff-
man (2000), among others. This attitude is different from Monod’s. Acknowledg-
ing, as Schrödinger and Kauffman did, that life cannot be accounted for by current 
physics, leads to questioning the generality of physics and to expanding or renewing 
physics itself.  
Schrödinger tried to identify what is the invariant element that might allow under-
standing the distinctive character of biological systems. He identified it with a spe-
cific type of order. In opposition with the statistic order of physical systems (“order 
from disorder”), that might give rise to macroscopic patterns, he identified the in-
variant element of living systems in what he called “order from order”. The basic 
idea is that of a positional order, embedded in a specific rigid molecular structure, 
an order which is then propagated throughout the system. Positional order is real-
ized in terms of rigid spatial organization, found at the molecular level in an aperi-
odic crystal and embedded in a specific sequence (see Bich & Damiano, 2008 for 
an analysis of different types of order and organizations). In Schrödinger’s view, 
living processes are controlled by highly stable groups of atoms which transmit their 
structural order to other molecular structures: in contemporary language, from the 
sequence of bases in the DNA to the sequence of amino acids in proteins. The con-
stancy of positions and sequences and the regularity of the relationships between 
parts (solid bodies whose form is maintained constant) is what allows organisms 
and machines such as mechanical clocks to function. Both are characterized as 
mechanisms and understood in terms of the relative positions of stable (ordered) 
components, a form of organization. 
This is not the only way to look at living systems in terms of organization. Or-
ganization can be understood in terms of static spatial relationships such as in this 
case, but also in terms of dynamic relationships between components and processes 
that undergo continuous transformations. In fact, if one focuses on processes and on 
the activities of components that realize living organisms, regularity and constancy 
might be the exception rather than the rule, or even the sign of a pathology (Bich et 
al., 2020). Organisms are adaptive systems whose internal dynamics and the fate 
and behavior of parts depend on the state of the system and its environment (Bich 
et al., 2016). Living systems constantly modify their components, and their internal 
mechanisms are highly dynamic. They are continuously modulated, activated or in-
hibited by regulatory mechanisms. From this point of view, which considers living 
systems as dynamical, the invariant aspect cannot be found in some structural reg-
ularity of sequence or positions at the level of parts but in a relational property at 
the level of the organization of the system. It is a property of the whole living sys-
tem. It cannot be referred to any specific component of it; rather, it rests on the 
peculiar and distinctive way the components—and the processes they are involved 
in—are related. 
A theoretical approach focused on this type of organization has been developed 
at the crossroad between cybernetics and systems theory by the tradition of biolog-
ical autonomy. It considers organization between parts and processes as the invari-
ant that captures the distinctive character of biological systems. Pioneering 
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conceptual and methodological intuitions in this respect can be found in Rashev-
sky’s work (1954), specifically in his emphasis on relations as what allows identi-
fying a system as a living one, and on the thesis that there is a core set of relations 
that is common to all living systems.  
The autonomy approach has been developed with the aim of identifying and 
understanding the nature and form of these relationships. This theoretical frame-
work was built upon pioneering work carried out by Jean Piaget (1967), Robert 
Rosen (1972), Humberto Maturana & Francisco Varela (Varela et al., 1974), How-
ard Pattee (1972), Tibor Ganti (1975), among others. Recently it was further devel-
oped by Stuart Kauffman (2000) and by Alvaro Moreno and collaborators (Moreno 
and Mossio, 2015). This approach characterizes a biological organism as an auton-
omous system capable of producing its own components and maintaining itself far 
from equilibrium with its environment. To explain this capacity, this tradition ap-
peals to the internal organization of the organism, which is maintained in spite of 
the continuous transformations that an organism undergoes at the level of compo-
nents.  
The core feature of this approach is the focus on the organization of the system. 
Organization refers to the way production and transformation processes are con-
nected so that they are able to synthesize the very components that realize them, by 
using energy and matter from the environment. In this view, the fundamental feature 
of the organization of (biological) self-maintaining systems is its circular topology 
as a network of processes of production of components that in turn realize and main-
tain the network itself. This distinctive type of generative circularity that character-
izes biological systems is known as ‘organizational closure’ (Piaget, 1967).  
This tradition answers at a different level Schrödinger’s question on life and on 
the invariant order that characterizes it: the abstract level of relationships between 
parts and processes instead of the level of the intrinsic properties of parts. As argued 
by Rosen, the idea of a circular invariant organization “looks very much like an 
aperiodic solid, and indeed it possesses many of the properties Schrödinger ascribed 
to that concept. The novel thing is that it is not a “real” solid. It is, rather, a pattern 
of causal organization” (Rosen, 2000: 23).  
These ideas have important epistemological implications. The first concerns 
what level of description is considered as the more pertinent to understand a biolog-
ical system: material parts, and therefore a bottom-up approach, or relationships, 
and therefore a top-down approach. While not excluding the first, the autonomy 
approach focuses mainly on the second, and characterizes the constituents of a bio-
logical system in terms of their dependence on and contribution to the system that 
harbors them: as functional components rather than material parts (Bich, 2012). I 
will come back to this point in the following sections. 
Another more general epistemological implication concerns the descriptive ap-
proach developed in the autonomy framework, which is based on organization. The 
organization of a system is defined as the topology of relations which allows scien-
tific observers to identify a system as a unity belonging to a certain class, that is, the 
class of living systems (Maturana, 1988). Such a definition entails the impossibility 
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of giving distinctions for granted and of considering scientific knowledge as inde-
pendent from the activity of observation and categorization performed by an ob-
server. The underlying idea, which is of particular interest when focusing on theo-
retical and formal modelling, is that an object studied by science is co-construed: 
the observer gives it an objectual form through the categories she resorts to, while 
the world, limiting the range of their applicability, defines the area in which nature 
can be handled in terms of those objects categorized by the observer (Damiano, 
2012). 
It is important to emphasize a couple of points. In the first place, this epistemo-
logical thesis does not mean that categorizations are arbitrary. It is the opposite; 
they are constrained by interactions with the world and they need to be theoretically 
coherent. The second is that when focusing on living organisms as self-producing 
and self-maintaining systems, whose existence and activity coincide, one makes a 
special type of distinction. An observer identifies a living system as autonomous in 
the same domain where the system specifies it through its internal operations. 
The theoretical and epistemological dimensions of biology are therefore distinc-
tive, or “special”, if life is addressed from the point of view of autonomy. In the 
next sections I discuss the implications of these ideas.  
3 Biological emergence and the autonomy of biology 
Looking at living systems from the perspective provided by the autonomy frame-
work has deep implications for an understanding of biology and its relationships 
with other domains of scientific investigation. The first derives from the identifica-
tion of a causal regime that is distinctively biological: that of organizational closure, 
according to which biological systems are capable of producing their own compo-
nents and maintain themselves, unlike other classes of natural and artificial systems 
(Moreno & Mossio, 2015). The focus of the autonomy framework is primary on the 
self-maintaining organization of the system and on the consequent idea that the ex-
istence and activities of parts depend on such organization. This approach centers 
on organization and activities of parts (i.e. interactions between parts, operations of 
parts on processes). The starting point is not components themselves. More specif-
ically, organization refers to the way production and transformation processes are 
connected so that they are able to synthesize the components that realize them by 
using energy and matter from the environment. Components are characterized func-
tionally in terms of their activities within a given organization. Studying the role of 
parts within the system, therefore, needs to take into account the type of organiza-
tion that harbors them.  
This approach raises the problem of how to describe such a highly integrated 
system and how to decompose it into its parts in order to understand its internal 
functioning. Surely, a living organism is not an ‘aggregative system’ or ‘component 
system’ (see Wimsatt, 1986; Bechtel & Richardson, 1993/2010). The parts that 
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contribute to biological phenomena of interest cannot be easily localized, and their 
activities cannot be considered as fully determined (once their triggering conditions 
are met) by their intrinsic properties.  
Instead, living systems can be considered as a type of ‘integrative system’ or 
‘semi-decomposable’ system (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993/2010): a class of sys-
tems in which the organization contributes to determine the activities of the parts, 
and the actual results of such activities depend on how their functioning is orches-
trated. More precisely, living autonomous systems might be considered as highly 
integrated systems, because not only the activities are ordered in such a way as to 
achieve specific results, but: (1) the parts depend on one another and on the system 
for their existence and (2) their activities are not regular and depend on the opera-
tions of other regulatory components within the system, which modulate the activ-
ities of parts on the basis of the state of the system and the environment (Bich et al., 
2016). Decomposing such systems and identifying the parts that are relevant to un-
derstand a specific phenomenon or mechanism is a complex endeavor, as showed 
for example by the history of the discovery of cell mechanisms, metabolic cycles, 
etc. (see Bechtel, 2006). 
For these reasons, in principle an approach based on autonomy privileges de-
composing strategies that proceed top-down from the system to the components that 
contribute to its activities (Rosen, 1991). One way to do so is functionally: to iden-
tify one or more activities that are necessary for the organisms to maintain itself and 
establish which type of operations are necessary to carry it out, and then to identify 
and characterize in terms of these operations the parts that realize them. It is what 
Rosen calls ‘analysis’ (Rosen, 1991). The alternative would be to identify the ana-
tomic components of the system, to study them and to use them as a starting point 
to conceptually reassemble the system. It is what Rosen calls ‘synthesis’ (Rosen 
1991). 
The relationships between top-down and bottom-up descriptions  ̶  i.e. trying to 
establish a correspondence between functional parts (identified and characterized 
top down), and structural ones (anatomic or material parts characterized through a 
bottom-up approach)  ̶  is highly problematic (Bich, 2012). Privileging either ap-
proach may result in shortcomings. An exclusive focus on top-down approaches 
might result in a functionalism characterized by an excessive degree of abstraction 
and lack of relevant concrete details (Levy & Bechtel, 2013). The risk is to overlook 
the importance of materiality and of physical aspects to understand how a living 
system is actually realized. The other way around, a bottom-up approach might lose 
sight of the causal regime that characterizes the system, with problems of selecting 
which properties of components are pertinent or not, what components are relevant 
to describe how a phenomenon is realized, how they behave in different ways de-
pending on the state of the system (Bich et al., 2016; 2020), and when they are not 
working properly (Saborido & Moreno, 2015; Bechtel, 2018). While irreducible, at 
least in practice, these two approaches need to proceed hand in hand.  
Moreover, it is important to point out that some of the challenges faced in de-
scribing biological autonomous systems is that some of the elements needed to 
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define the dynamics of the system are determined, at least in part, from within. By 
interacting with the environment and establishing their own internal environment, 
living systems contribute to determine some of the boundary conditions that allow 
them (and their internal processes) to exist; they also determine and modulate some 
of the parameters of their internal dynamics, for example by activating or inhibiting 
the activity of enzymes and regulatory proteins, and finally, the rules of interaction 
between parts depend on what components are produced and how their operations 
are modulated by regulatory mechanisms (Kampis, 1991; Bich & Bocchi, 2012; 
Longo et al., 2012; Koutroufinis, 2017). One may also argue that the organization 
of the system has a role in determining or constraining the behavior of the parts (El-
Hani & Queiroz, 2005; Mossio et al., 2013).  
The idea of a distinctive causal regime of self-maintenance and the epistemic 
implications it brings to surface with regards to the study of biological systems, 
have often led to associating biological autonomy with emergence (Rosen, 1991; 
Varela, 1997; Kauffman, 2000; Bich, 2006; Mossio et al., 2013). The causal irre-
ducibility of the regime of organizational closure is paired with an epistemological 
irreducibility: a number of limitations regarding the possibility of understanding, 
modelling and formalizing these types of systems. Different types of descriptions 
(such as in term of material and functional parts) coexist, and so do irreducible no-
tions (such as sequence and function).  
In general, there is no preferential or more pertinent heuristics in general. What 
types of heuristics one needs to adopt may depend on the specific phenomenon un-
der investigation. For example, let us think about the strategies employed in the 
discovery of physiological processes such as fermentation and oxidative phosphor-
ylation, which sought the opposition between reductionist and anti-reductionist ap-
proaches, with competing agendas and heuristics (Bechtel & Richardson, 1992). In 
the late nineteenth century, while reductionists associated fermentation with inde-
pendent chemical reactions, anti-reductionists such as Schwann and Pasteur argued 
that fermentation required taking into consideration the circumstances found in liv-
ing cells instead of looking only to parts. The discovery of the mechanisms of fer-
mentation happened in several steps in a period spanning from the last decades of 
the nineteenth and to the first ones of the twentieth centuries. It did not result in the 
reduction of this phenomenon to a chain of reactions, although reactions had to be 
identified. Looking also at the types of connections between the reactions involved 
resulted in the discovery of an organized biochemical system characterized by sev-
eral causal loops: “a highly integrated, interlocking system of reactions” (Bechtel & 
Richardson, 1992: 273).  
Similarly, the discovery of oxidative phosphorylation also showed the difficul-
ties of identifying the pertinent levels for explaining the phenomenon under inves-
tigation. It required considering not only individual reactions and their dynamical 
organization, but also including structural aspects at a different scale than that of 
chemical reactions, such as the macroscopic structure of the mitochondrion and in 
particular of its systems of endomembranes, which were studied through electronic 
microscopy. Moreover, as shown by Bechtel and Richardson (1992), techniques 
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that were relevant for one level of descriptions often concealed or even destroyed 
crucial aspects of the phenomena investigated, which were only available, instead, 
at other levels of description. 
Many of these considerations, apart from those derived from the notion of or-
ganizational closure, are not exclusive of biological systems. Physics provides ex-
amples and formal models of natural phenomena that can be considered as emergent 
and that cannot be predicted or deduced from a description of their constituents or 
from an initial state. These phenomena, therefore, are described by employing mod-
els that are irreducible to one another (Pessa, 1998). From physics itself comes a 
questioning of the very idea of a fundamental level of description and of fundamen-
tal objects (Pessa, 2011; Bitbol, 2007).  
However, I focus here, from a systemic perspective, on a few elements which, 
among others, are distinctively biological and ground some degree of autonomy for 
this discipline. They are useful in order to discuss then the epistemic status of biol-
ogy. Among the differences between the domains of physics and biology, Longo 
and Montevil (2013), have discussed what are the features of the objects character-
istic of either domain and how to describe their behaviors. Physical objects are ge-
neric because different objects of the same category have the same intrinsic features 
and behave in the same way. Their trajectories in phase space are instead specific 
and defined by the relative equations. For biological objects, the opposite is true: 
they are specific while their behavior is generic as they follow a possible evolution-
ary trajectory in the phase space. 
What about some core biological concepts such as teleology, function, integra-
tion, regulation, control, neither of which has a counterpart in physics nor has been 
reduced to physical concepts? These concepts make biological explanation theoret-
ically independent from the physical and chemical ones. They enable explanations 
that are directly grounded in the specificity of biological phenomenology rather than 
derived from lower-level explanations. These concepts may constitute heuristic 
tools that are useful to address biological phenomena in practice, but different at-
tempts have also been made to naturalize them and make them well-grounded the-
oretical notions.  
One interesting case is that of processes oriented towards a final state. In physics 
one can find, among others, the Geodesic Principle, Le Chatelier’s principle and the 
Second Law of Thermodynamic, which describe how the trajectories of certain sys-
tems tend to proceed towards a final state such as for example, thermodynamic equi-
librium. Biological systems exhibit a similar yet qualitatively distinct feature: they 
actively pursue certain states, which can be considered the goals of the system. What 
for physical systems are end states, for biological ones become goals, aims, pur-
poses. All these notions, which belong to the category of teleology, are not just ways 
of speaking or heuristic tools, useful to describe the behavior of a system, but can 
be provided a naturalized grounding in the autonomous organization of living sys-
tems (Mossio & Bich, 2017, see also Schlosser, 1998; Delancey, 2006). A living 
system is characterized by the distinctive capability to produce, transform and repair 
its components which realize and maintain the system through its interactions with 
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the environment. Its own activity and those of its parts are, in a fundamental sense, 
oriented toward an end. The goal of the system is to maintain itself. It is true that 
there are other systems, among artifacts, which are considered as goal-oriented in 
their behavior. An example is a thermostat, which controls the temperature of a 
room to maintain it within a certain interval of temperature. Yet there is a funda-
mental difference between this type of goal-oriented behavior and the teleological 
one of biological systems. It amounts to the difference between following or having 
a goal (Jonas, 1953). Artifacts follow a goal. The goal of artifacts is determined 
extrinsically, by the designer or the user. Following this goal does not contribute to 
the existence of the artifact. Biological systems “act on their own behalf” (Kauff-
man, 2000). They have an intrinsic goal, which is their own existence. 
Another fundamental concept for biology is that of function, which also has a 
teleological dimension. Functional explanations are widespread in biology, and 
parts and traits of living systems are often characterized in terms of what they do. 
There are general accounts of functions, such as the dispositional one, which are 
generic and can be applied to almost any class of system (Cummins, 1975). The 
dispositional approach identifies the function of a part with its causal role in a larger 
system. Yet the generality of this concept sacrifices other aspects which are im-
portant in developing a scientific explanation. Ascribing functions to a part in terms 
of causal role may be arbitrary and it may not provide a normative basis for distin-
guishing which among many causal effects to count as the function of a component.  
Nevertheless, there are principled way to ascribe functions that are specifically 
biological (i.e. capture the distinctive and irreducible character of biological func-
tions) and, unlike the dispositional account, justify claims such as that the function 
of the heart is to pump blood (and not, for example, to make noise). The most wide-
spread account is based on evolutionary considerations, and characterizes a function 
as a selected effect of a trait of an organism which contributed to the survival of the 
ancestors of that organism (Millikan, 1989; Neander, 1991). The autonomy frame-
work, instead, characterizes functions in terms of contributions to the maintenance 
of the organism. A function is understood as a contribution of a trait to the mainte-
nance of an autonomous organization (e.g., a living cell) that, in turn, contributes to 
producing and maintaining the trait itself (Collier, 2000; McLaughlin, 2001; Chris-
tensen & Bickhard, 2002; Mossio et al., 2009). The way functional ascriptions are 
justified and employed in biology does not have counterparts in physics and chem-
istry. 
4 Is Biology marginal? Insights for an epistemology of complex 
systems 
The previous sections have discussed the theoretical account of living systems based 
on the notions of biological autonomy and organization. They showed how, if one 
adopts this perspective, biological phenomena can be considered emergent from the 
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causal and epistemological points of view. In this scenario, the biological domain 
can be considered as exhibiting distinctive phenomena and requiring concepts that 
have no counterpart in other scientific domains that focus on lower levels of organ-
ization. 
However, biological phenomena are rarer than physical and chemical ones, and 
biology as a discipline concerns distinctive phenomena, exhibits a certain degree of 
autonomy (although not self-sufficiency) with respect to other sciences, and em-
ploys its own concepts. Does this mean that biology is marginal, as argued by 
Monod (1970)? And is there a wider lesson to be learned from biology? These ques-
tions can be addressed in multiple ways by either focusing on theoretical aspects or 
epistemic ones. I argue that, from both points of view, the answer is that biology is 
not marginal and there are lessons to be learned from it.  
One way to approach these issues is theoretical. If the tools of sciences such as 
physics and chemistry, although useful and unavoidable, are unable to provide an 
understanding of what living systems are and how they function, one needs to ex-
pand science. This answer is in line with claims such as the one made within phi-
losophy by Hans Jonas. When discussing life, he argued that “if life is not within 
the competence of an alleged cosmic principle, though it is in every sense within 
the cosmos, then that principle is inadequate for the cosmos as well” (Jonas, 1966: 
65). The research projects carried out by Schrödinger (1944) and Kauffman (2000) 
 ̶  aimed respectively at developing a new physics, or new laws, to make sense of 
living systems as natural phenomena  ̶  constitute attempts to respond to these ques-
tions within science. These attempts aim to extend a cohesive set of theoretical tools. 
Another possibility, more in line with the autonomy framework, is to complement 
the tools provided by physics and chemistry with new tools, such as organizational 
closure, specifically developed for addressing living systems. In the first case, biol-
ogy would not be marginal because it would be part of an extended, more general, 
physics; in the second case because it would be source of new theoretical tools and 
principles applied in combination with those of physics and chemistry: a more gen-
eral science. In both cases, biology would be a source of new lessons for science. 
Acknowledging the distinctive character of biological systems implies on the 
one hand the idea that the biological domain should not be considered as a particular 
case of other domains considered as more fundamental, such as physics and chem-
istry. Biological systems can be investigated in their specificity only by building 
new types of theoretical and descriptive models. On the other hand, it makes it nec-
essary to consider the natural world as characterized by a range of phenomena much 
wider and richer than what can be addressed through the tools of one discipline or 
approach alone, be it biology or physics. This, according to Rosen, is one of the 
meanings of Schrödinger’s insight on a new physics, which becomes the foundation 
for a theoretical research program for biology and for complexity sciences in gen-
eral. According to Rosen, Monod’s thesis on the marginality of biology rests on the 
idea that organisms are “just specializations of what is already on the shelf provided 
by old physics, and that to claim otherwise is mere vitalism” (Rosen, 2000: 26). 
Organisms are indeed rare if compared to other material systems. Yet Rosen argues 
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that Monod’s argument builds upon an artifact of sampling: a confusion between 
‘rare’ and ‘special’ (in the sense of marginal). 
In sum, from the theoretical point of view, organisms are more general, insofar 
as they exhibit properties and phenomena that require the development of new con-
ceptual categories, capable to capture also those aspects, such as closure, teleology, 
functionality, regulation, control, that escape other conceptual frameworks. There 
is something qualitatively different in biological systems, invisible to other sci-
ences, and that requires a conceptual rethinking and new categorizations to be em-
ployed together with those derived from other sciences such as physics or chemis-
try. In this sense the study of living systems and of their distinctive character carries 
a lesson on nature and science in general.  
The other way to address the questions is to focus on epistemic aspects, and to 
consider biological systems as paradigmatic cases of complex systems. This episte-
mological thesis is specifically connected to the problem of the relationships be-
tween scientific disciplines and descriptive strategies. It supports a non-reduction-
istic approach oriented towards establishing of communicative circuits between 
disciplines and between different heuristics within a discipline: biology as a model 
for an epistemology of complex systems characterized by different irreducible ap-
proaches and descriptive tools which coexist and interact; a domain characterized 
by multidirectional transfers of models, questions and theoretical structures. 
Let us consider some issues deriving from the difficulty of establishing connec-
tions between different types of observations, models, observables, etc. As dis-
cussed in Section 2, the relationships between directions of observation is one of 
these cases. In the autonomy approach the observables that are built bottom-up from 
the observation of intrinsic properties of the parts and those built top-down in terms 
of functional properties (identified with regards to the contribution of components 
to the system) do not necessarily coincide (Rosen, 1991; Bich, 2012). Material and 
functional components may not be one and the same thing. An example is the case 
of enzymes. A bottom-up analysis in terms of sequence of ammino acids may not 
covey the same information as a structural analysis of the configuration and func-
tionality of the folded molecule. For the same sequence there might be several con-
figurations, depending on the boundary conditions present during folding, the ac-
tivity of chaperons, and of several regulatory interactions such as phosphorylation 
and allosteric control. A mixed approach is often fruitful to predict possible regula-
tory sites, and how interactions at these sites changes the probability of having a 
given configuration (and functional capability) of the molecule.  
Moreover, differences in the types and scales of observation may provide dif-
ferent pictures of the biological phenomenon under investigation. Let us think again 
of the discovery of phenomena such as fermentation and oxidative phosphorylation 
(Bechtel & Richardson, 1992). Whereas a study of individual chemical reactions, 
or sequences of reactions, was an important aspect, it proved to be insufficient to 
provide an understanding of these two phenomena. Some gestalt switches were 
needed. In the case of fermentation, a different type of perspective was needed, fo-
cused on the topology of the relationships between the reactions, i.e. their 
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organization, which led to the discovery of chemical cycles. The case of oxidative 
phosphorylation showed the importance of taking into account different irreducible 
scales by complementing the investigation of chemical reactions with that of the 
role of macroscopic structures such as membranes, which constrain these reactions 
and enable different types of processes.  
Similar considerations can be made with respect to general strategies employed 
to describe and model living autonomous systems. As argued by Moreno and Suarez 
(2020), two irreducible strategies provide information on different aspects of the 
system. One is network modelling: a holistic tool used to study and predict global 
dynamical properties of large sets of interacting entities. It has often been employed 
to investigate the dynamical properties (e.g. stability and robustness) of abstract 
theoretical models of the organization of biological autonomous systems (Piedrafita 
et al., 2010). The other strategy is the new mechanistic one, which aims to provide 
a causal explanation of how the individual parts of the systems, or the parts of one 
or several subsystems, functionally operate and interact within autonomous systems 
to realize specific phenomena. This strategy has been recently applied to model and 
analyze phenomena such as mammary organogenesis (Montevil et al., 2016) and 
glycaemia regulation (Bich et al., 2020) from an autonomy perspective. Network 
and mechanistic strategies provide different information on the system. Although 
irreducible to each other, they can be combined. Network modeling, for example 
can be used to support mechanistic descriptions. Identifying the most connected 
nodes of a network may provide insight into what may be the relevant functional 
components responsible for producing the phenomenon under investigation 
(Bechtel, 2015).  
These examples show both the importance of considering how the system is 
organized in different layers—which instantiate distinct and complementary de-
scriptive domains—and to take into account the role of the observer who needs to 
adopt different modalities of description in order to account for them. The common 
aspect to these examples is that sets of models derived from different observational 
operations or descriptive strategies provide different, though complementary, infor-
mation about the system under study. They show the failure or the inadequacy of a 
single descriptive modality and the consequent necessity to include new ones. Some 
modalities might be more relevant or pertinent than others depending on the phe-
nomenon to study and the aims of the scientist, but there seems to be no privileged 
one so that best result are obtained when more strategies are used in combination.  
For these reasons it can be claimed that biological systems are emergent from 
an epistemological standpoint. Emergence in this sense depends on the relationship 
between different models that are needed in order to describe the system and de-
pends on the experiences performed by an observer who interacts with it. In this 
framework it can be expressed as the lack of a direct relationship between different 
descriptions made in distinct domains or different types of descriptions of the same 
phenomenon (Bich, 2012). 
These conclusions, drawn from the discussion of a systemic account of biologi-
cal systems, have a more general relevance. They are in line with Rosen’s 
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epistemological account of complexity, according to which “To say that a system is 
complex […] is to say that we can describe the same system in a variety of distinct 
ways […]. Complexity then ceases to be an intrinsic property of a system, but it is 
rather a function of the number of separate descriptions required […]. Therefore, a 
system is simple to the extent that a single description suffices to account for our 
interaction with the system; it is complex to the extent that it fails to be true.” (Rosen 
1978, p. 112). This notion is focused on the relationship between classes of observ-
ables that converge in different models. Complexity can be defined as the insuffi-
ciency of a single model, and of the set of observables related to it, to describe a 
system. Consequently, a model needs to be replaced or complemented by other 
ones, because the system exhibits to the observer new characteristics which were 
not present before or at a different level of description, and which are thus invisible 
to the chosen observables that constitute the starting description. 
This perspective is also in line with a heuristic of complex systems such as the 
one proposed by Minati, Penna and Pessa (Minati et al., 1998; Minati & Pessa, 
2006), based on the dynamical usage of models: the interaction between different, 
and often complementary, models which work in the traditional way just inside their 
limited domain of validity. This means not just that one needs to choose an individ-
ual model as the more appropriate in order to address a specific issue, but also that 
to investigate complex systems one may need to employ more than one descriptive 
modality at the same time and multiple interacting models.  
On this basis, one may argue that biology is general insofar as it constitutes a 
paradigmatic example of complexity science, both in terms of how it defines the 
theoretical object of study and of the epistemology and heuristics employed. Ad-
dressing biological phenomena from an autonomy perspective brings to the atten-
tion in a wider context the limitations of approaches based on simple systems and 
the virtues of adopting ones based on complexity. Focusing on organization, func-
tion, teleology and other biological notions, for example, shows how scientific in-
vestigation needs to combine analytic and synthetic strategies. Understanding what 
makes a system a living organism, which exhibits distinctive features with respect 
to physical and chemical systems, has relevant consequences not just for those 
“rare” phenomena pertaining to biology but for scientific explanation in general, 
more so for the study of complex systems. It provides theoretical and epistemolog-
ical grounds to advocate a pluralist perspective combining different points of view 
and descriptive and explanation strategies.   
Therefore, addressing question “what is life?”, that is, the problem of defining 
and characterizing living systems, does not consist only in responding to the needs 
of one discipline. It has wider consequences, or lessons, and introduces more gen-
eral questions that cut across scientific domains. Focusing on biological systems 
and their specificities shows how complex phenomena may escape individual strat-
egies, how general fundamental issues related to complex systems such as the no-
tion of system as an integrated organized entity, the relationship between wholes 
and parts need to be addressed in more than one way and direction. The challenge, 
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each time, is to understand how to combine these different tools and strategies rather 
than extend a given one or choosing one among many. 
5 Conclusions. A practice of complex systems 
The passage from a conceptual discussion of complex systems to their study and 
modelling in practice, from theory to art one might say, is not direct and it may be 
quite difficult. This is especially relevant for philosophers, whose goals are often 
generality and abstraction, but who constantly face the risk of the excess of ideali-
zation, of striving for clear-cut concepts and distinctions that as a result may be too 
detached from scientific work. In the study of complex systems, where the activity 
of scientists and its limitations play a crucial role, this might create a gap between 
epistemological thought and actual modelling, and even lead to naïve conclusions 
about the relation between theoretical science, modelling, and the natural world. In 
particular, the study of theories and models of complex systems requires tools and 
heuristics to identify and analyze their limitations and to discuss how such limita-
tions can be  faced by employing multiple strategies.  
In this context, virtuous examples are fundamental to develop epistemological 
thinking. I consider myself honored and lucky for having had the opportunity to 
know Eliano Pessa as teacher, supervisor and then colleague. He guided me through 
my first steps into complex systems thinking from the point of view of science. Not 
only he introduced me to the notion of emergence and to the theoretical work of 
Rashevsky, Rosen and of Maturana and Varela, but with his generosity and honesty 
he gave a virtuous example of the art of studying and modelling complex systems, 
with all the difficulties and stimulating challenges that characterize this practice, 
and he transmitted his enthusiasm to students and colleagues. In particular, I re-
member his capability of making explicit the idealizations underlying models and 
discussing their implications, of explaining with incredible clarity the ingenious 
models he developed while at the same time always showing their limitations with 
irony, precision and detail. With his example, Eliano Pessa demonstrated that striv-
ing for honesty is a fundamental epistemic value in scientific research and showed 
the importance of giving substance to epistemological and theoretical thinking. 
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